

## EXHIBIT NO. 32

## MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII

FROM JULY 8 TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(All dates refer to 1941)

Date	From	To	Subject	Page
8 July	Adj Gen	Short	Japanese Policy	1
25 July	CNO	Kimmel et al.	Economic Sanctions against Japan.	2
16 Oct.	CNO	Kimmel et al.	Japanese cabinet range	3
20 Oct.	Adj Gen	Short	Estimate of Japanese situation.	4
24 Nov.	CNO	Kimmel et al.	Warning of surprise aggressive movement.	5
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28 Nov.	MacArthur	Marshall	Reply to Marshall warning	11
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29 Nov.	Caribbean Defense Command.	Adj Gen	Reply to Marshall warning	18
4 Dec.	Hawaiian Air Force	Arnold	Reply to Arnold sabotage cable.	19
5 Dec.	G-2	G-2 Hawaii	Japanese weather code broadcasts.	20
7 Dec.	Marshall	Short	Japanese ultimatum	21

[1] Secret  
94 WAR BC 207 WD

WASHINGTON, D. C., 152A, July 8, 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H.

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups period This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian Garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia period Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out period Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated period They have ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August period Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned

ADAMS  
334P/720P/8  
Priority

[2] Drafter: Op-12.  
From: Chief of Naval Operations.  
Released by: H. R. Stark.  
Date: July 25, 1941.

Addressee  
For Action  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF  
CINCLANT  
COM 15  
SPENAVO LONDON

252023

This is a joint dispatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff US Army X Appropriate aedes deliver copies to Commanding Generals Hawaii Philippines and Caribbean Defense Command and to General Chaney in London XX You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty-sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan X It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material X It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk X Japanese assets and fund in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement X It is not repeat not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time X United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan X CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities X Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date XX This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Navy and Army subordinates X SPENAVO informs CNS but warn him against disclosure X Action aedes this dis are Cincpac Cinclant Cincac Com Fifteen Spenavo London XX  
Secret

[3] Drafter: Op-12.  
From: CNO.  
Released by: Ingersol.

Addressees                      Priority  
For action  
CINCLANT  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF  
(Acknowledge)

Date: October 16, 1941.

162203                      CR 0534

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third aedes inform appropriate army and naval district authorities X Acknowledge XX  
Secret

[4] Secret  
8 WVY BC 47 WD

WASHN., D. C., 1234P., Oct. 20, 1941.

20th Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your information stop Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent

ADAMS

1037A

[5] Sealed Secret  
Drafter: Op-12.  
From: Chief of Naval Operations.  
Released by: Ingersoll.

Addressees  
For action  
CINCAF  
CINCPAC  
COM 11  
COM 12  
COM 13  
COM 15  
For information  
SPENAVO LONDON  
CINCLANT

Date: November 24, 1941.



242005 CR0443

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action aedes to inform senior army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.  
Copy to WPD, War Dept., and to Op-12 but no other distribution

[6] Secret  
RCA 831 US Govt

November 26, 1941

Washington, D. C., Nov. 26, 1941. 1149P.

COMMANDING GENERAL,  
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Four Six Five Twenty Six

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advise Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department Stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu

ADAMS

[7] Secret

Priority

November 27, 1941.

Priority

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

No. 472

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue Period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment Period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act Period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense Period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent Period Report measures taken Period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan Period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

MARSHALL

War Department message center: Please send same radiogram to: Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, Quarry Heights, C. Z.

[8] Priority

November 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,  
Western Defense Command,  
Presidio of San Francisco, California.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period A separate message is being sent to G dash two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

MARSHALL

[9] Priority

November 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,  
U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, Manila, P. I.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary period Report measures taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised rainbow five which was delivered to you by General Brereton period Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request you notify Hart

MARSHALL

Secret

[10] Secret

P 2 War WD Prty

Washington, D. C., November 27, 1941.

G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Ft. Shafter, T. H.

473-27TH

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only.

MILES

144PM

[11] NOVEMBER 28, 1941.  
453AM

From: Manila, P. I.  
To: General George C. Marshall  
No. 1004, November Twenty-eighth.

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

MACARTHUR.

Secret



[12]

NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

557AM

Secret

Priority

From: Fort Shafter T. H.

To: Chief of Staff

No. 959 November 27th

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy  
reurad four seven two twenty seventh

SHORT.

[13] Secret

114 War Kr 189 WD Prty

Washn D. C. 842P Nov. 28, 1941

C G

Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T. H.

482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions

ADAMS.

Secret

[14] secret

Priority

COMMANDING GENERAL,

*Hawaii Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.:*

Sent No. 484, 11/28.

Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired colon against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department paren see paragraph three mid SR three zero dash four five paren the present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following colon protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment comma property and establishments period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security period Para it is also desired that or on before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions period signed Arnold.

ADAMS.

A. F. No. 461

Secret

[15]

Secret

Received: NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

11: 18 PM

From: HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.,

To: General George C. Marshall

November 28th:

Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance

control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and subsector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SFP of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As Air Forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP five two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operations of Air Forces in defense [15A] of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

DEWITT, *Commanding.*

[16]

Secret

Received, NOVEMBER 29, 1941.  
346 AM

From: Panama.

To: The AGO.

Panama No. 569; November 28th:

Reurad four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report requested being forwarded air mail. CDC six eight seven.

ANDREWS.

[17] Secret

Priority

29 NOVEMBER 1941.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL

*War Department, Washington D C*

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash four five end paren and Military Establishments including personnel and equipment Stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding [17A] General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with F B I and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

SHORT



[18]  
Secret

NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

Subject: Measures Taken for the Defense of the Caribbean Area.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. In compliance with radiogram No. 461 from the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, report that the following measures are in effect for the protection of the Caribbean Area:

a. *Naval Measures.* At the present time, it is believed that the defensive measures for the Caribbean Defense Command center largely around the Panama Canal; however, a plan for furnishing Army support to the Navy has been worked out and coordinated with the various Naval commanders in the Caribbean Theater. In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance.

b. *Measures for the Defense of the Panama Canal.* No additional measures other than those already in effect, have been taken for the defense of the Panama Canal, except to increase inspections in order to insure the alertness of troops. Measures, in effect are:

(1) *Harbor Defense.* Troops are on a continuous alert. Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval defense.

(2) *Aircraft Warning Service.* The two detectors installed are on a 24-hour alert. Seven observation posts have been established at various places in Panama with direct radio communication to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center. Within the means on hand, every effort is being made to complete the installation of other detectors now available within the Department.

(3) *Antiaircraft Artillery.* All available antiaircraft equipment is installed and on a 24-hour alert.

(4) *Anti-Sabotage.* Locks and other sensitive areas are continuously guarded, and all approaches to the sensitive areas are covered by mound bunkers. Approaches to bunkers and between bunkers were practicable are covered by patrols. Transit guards are placed on all vessels transiting the Canal.

(5) *Counter-espionage.* Active counter-espionage measures are being taken continuously.

[18A] (6) *Counter-subversive activities.* with the cooperation of the Republic of Panama, are in continuous operation. Plans have been prepared with the cooperation of the Republic of Panama, for the internment of aliens, and a list of those who should be interned upon the outbreak of hostilities has been prepared and is in the hands of the American Ambassador, to be transmitted to the Panamanian Government. The Canal Zone itself has already been cleared of any known suspects.

(7) *Air Force.* A portion of the pursuit is on a continuous 24-hour alert. The Bomber Command headquarters maintains a 24-hour alert. This latter applies to the whole Caribbean Area.

c. *In Caribbean Theater, other than Panama Canal Department.*

(1) Air Corps units with from three to six B-18 or B-18-A medium bombers have been stationed at St. Croix, Antigua, St. Lucia and British Guiana. The 9th Bombardment Group (less squadrons in St. Lucia, British Guiana, and Surinam), with six B-18-A medium bombers, has been stationed at Trinidad. These units have a reconnaissance mission in the vicinity of these bases and a mission to support the Navy.

(2) A composite squadron with six (6) B-18-A medium bombers and eight (8) P-40 pursuit planes will arrive in Surinam about December 3, 1941.

(3) The ground elements of Force "A" consisting of Headquarters and Service Detachments, three composite companies of infantry and three antiaircraft platoons (each with six .50 Cal. machine guns) are enroute to Surinam. Entire force should arrive by December 5, 1941.

(4) One battalion, 33rd Infantry, with certain service elements, will be moved to Trinidad, departing Panama on December 3 and 13, 1941. One pursuit squadron will be moved to Trinidad as soon as transportation is available.

2. The efficacy of the measures taken for the defense of the Caribbean is qualified by certain deficiencies which exist in the Caribbean Defense Command. These deficiencies are:

a. *Harbor Defenses*: Less than one complete manning detail available for the harbor defense armament.

b. *Aircraft Warning Service* is totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand and in personnel to man the equipment when installed (see 1st Ind., these headquarters, dated October 17, 1941, to The Adjutant General, on AG 320.2 (8/23/41)MC-C, dated September 2, 1941, subject: "Air Defense Organization").

c. *Antiaircraft Artillery* has insufficient personnel to man armament now being installed in the Canal Zone, and inadequate protection against low-flying aircraft, particularly at night, since it has only sufficient ammunition for one minute of fire per gun for its 37 mm guns, and no barrage balloons. There is also a lack of proper searchlights to light field of fire of automatic weapons.

[18B] d. *Air Forces*. No night pursuit. No VHF radio equipment with which to direct pursuit in the air. Only eight modern long-range bombers and twelve modern light bombers are available within the Caribbean Defense Command. No 37 mm cannon for P-39's.

e. The situations in Puerto Rico and the Base Commands are so new, and their major deficiencies so well known that no attempt has been made to enumerate them.

F. M. ANDREWS,

*Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding.*

[19]

Secret  
11 WTJ  
1251P/4th

Received DECEMBER 10, 1941  
124 P. M.

From: Ft. Shafter, TH  
To: Chief Army Air Corps.  
No. 1033, December 4th.

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in agwar four eight four dash twenty eight colon instructions contained in subject radiogram issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received comma and continues to receive comma detailed and comprehensive attention as result of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July for one Stop Para additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiogram substantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Personal inspection of stations and activities by air force commander one and two December Stop Increase in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma now in progress Stop This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para secrecy discipline being given all emphasis practicable through official and quasi official agencies Stop Work has actually been begun on essential protective fencing and flood [19A] lighting projects Stop Para with reference to counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks Stop Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possibly in form of development and expansion of foreword to soldiers handbook comma FM twenty one dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citizen comma ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American Government comma structure of government comma place of military establishment in the structure comma national objectives comma both domestic and international comma together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to democratic form Stop Signed Martin end

SHORT.



[20]

Secret

Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,

G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES.

[21]

Secret

1549WS Washington DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft. Shafter, T. H.

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL.

## EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Military Intelligence Estimates, 1 July-7 December 1941*

Item	Date	Subject
1	7 July	Estimate of the Eastern Pacific Situation.
2	11 July	Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
3	17 July	Japanese Movement into French Indo-China.
4	17 July	Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.
5	18 July	New Japanese Cabinet.
6	18 July	Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
7	20 July	Paranoid against Japan.
8	20 July	German-Japanese Relations.
9	26 August	Development of the Far Eastern Situation.
10	26 August	Chinese Situation.
11	1 September	Cooperation between the Japanese Military Attache and the Chief of the Eastern Section.
12	2 September	Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.
13	11 September	Political Fortifications in Japan.
14	17 September	Current Estimate, 1941.
15	18 September	Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
16	18 September	Crisis in Japan.
17	2 October	Japanese-American Relations.
18	24 October	Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.
19	27 October	Japan's New Premier.
20	28 October	Continuing terms of the Hirohito Army.
21	1 November	Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
22	1 November	G-2 Estimate Far Eastern Situation.
23	12 November	Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
24	20 November	Far Eastern Situation.
25	20 November	Japanese Naval Task Force.
26	20 November	Recent Developments in the Far East.
27	20 November	Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation, December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.
28	2 December	Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.
29	8 December	Exchange of Japanese Troops in Indo-China.
30	8 December	Estimate of Japanese Air and Ground Forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa.

Note.—Items 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21, 25, 26 were classified Secret.

Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30 were classified Confidential.